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INTRODUCTION 
Is it constitutional for states to prevent skilled workers with temporary 
work visas from obtaining professional licenses?  The Circuit Courts of 
Appeal have reached different answers. 
In the 2012 case Dandamudi v. Tisch, the Second Circuit ruled that a 
New York law which prevents “nonimmigrants,” a broad term describing 
aliens legally in the United States on a temporary basis, from receiving a 
license to practice pharmacy was unconstitutional as applied to certain 
skilled immigrants present in the United States on temporary visas.
1
  The 
Second Circuit’s opinion explicitly rejected a 2005 Fifth Circuit decision, 
LeClerc v. Webb, which affirmed the constitutionality of a Louisiana 
Supreme Court rule that prohibited all nonimmigrants, including skilled 
guest workers, from sitting for Louisiana’s bar exam.
2
 
 
 1.  Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012).  The decision overruled § 6805 
(1)(6) of New York’s Education Law.  Compare id. with N.Y. Educ. Law § 6805 (2009).  
The plaintiffs in the case had obtained licenses under a waiver to the requirement, but the 
waiver program ended in 2009. Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 69.  Other New York statutes 
attempted to do the same thing in other fields.  For example, veterinary licenses were 
restricted to citizens and permanent residents. N.Y. Educ. Law § 6704 (6) (2007).  That law 
was also held to violate the Equal Protection Clause and Supremacy Clause. Kirk v. New 
York State Dept. of Educ., 562 F. Supp. 2d 405, 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).  It is important to 
note that Dandamudi was an ‘as applied’ challenge to the New York statute, as opposed to a 
facial challenge, as is clear from the lower court decision on appeal before the Second 
Circuit.  Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 2.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).  The rule in question stated at the 
time of the suit:  “[e]very applicant for admission to the Bar of this state shall . . . [b]e a 
citizen of the United States or a resident alien thereof.” Id. at 410.  The rule “effectively 
prohibit[ed] . . . nonimmigrant aliens who are not entitled to live and work in the United 
States permanently from sitting for the Louisiana Bar.” Id.  The rule was revised in 2009 to 
allow those authorized to work in the United States to sit for the exam. Sup. Ct. Rules, Rule 
17 § (3)(b), 8 L.S.A. – R.S.  The question of whether the rule was permissible to begin with 
remains open.  Outside of the employment law context, the Sixth Circuit declined to strike 
down a Tennessee law that prevented nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining drivers licenses.  
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007).  The court 
relied on many of the arguments adopted by the majority in the LeClerc decision in reaching 
its decision. Id. at 532-33.  These cases continue to influence other courts addressing 
questions regarding state laws that affect aliens.  See, e.g., Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 
No. CV12–02546 PHX DGC., 2013 WL 2128315, at *12 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013) 
(discussing LeClerc v. Webb and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen and 
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The ultimate resolution of the split will help define the constitutional 
rights of skilled guest workers, who play an important role in the U.S. 
economy and whose ranks are likely to grow if and when Congress adopts 
immigration reform legislation.  It will also open or close an avenue for 
opponents of the skilled guest worker program to influence policy at the 
state level.  This comment argues that the Second Circuit was correct in 
rejecting the New York law as applied.  State laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants violate the Equal Protection Clause and are preempted by 
the Immigration and Nationality Act when they are used to discriminate 
against skilled workers who are present in the United States on temporary 
work visas. 
This Comment begins by exploring the skilled guest worker program 
in the United States.  In part II, it considers whether state licensure bans 
targeting these workers violate the Equal Protection Supremacy Clauses.  
The comment concludes by proposing a legislative solution to the problem. 
I. THE SKILLED GUEST WORKER PROGRAM 
A. Exploring the Immigration Status of Skilled Guest Workers 
“Nonimmigrant” is a broad term that encompasses people holding 
dozens of different types of visas.
3
  Nonimmigrants are individuals 
admitted to the United States for a limited time to achieve a specific 
purpose, such as studying, working temporarily, conducting business, or 
simply touring the country.
4
  Skilled guest workers are but one subset of 
individuals under the nonimmigrant umbrella.  Many skilled guest workers 
hold H1-B visas, which cover people coming to the United States to 
perform services in a “specialty occupation.”
5
  H1-B visas expire after three 
years, but can be extended to six.  A specialty occupation is defined by 
federal statute as one that requires the “theoretical and practical application 
of a body of highly specialized knowledge”, and “attainment of a 
 
their relevance). 
 3.  The H1-B visa is one of dozens of different visa types that fall under the 
nonimmigrant category.  Nonimmigrants holding other types of visas, such as H2-A and 
H2-B workers, also play an important role in the U.S. economy.  However, many of the 
plaintiffs in LeClerc and Dandamudi held H1-B visas, making it the focus of this Comment.  
For a list of the various types of visas falling under the nonimmigrant heading, see 22 C.F.R. 
§ 41.12, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/22CFR/HTML/22CFR/0-0-0-1/0-
0-0-500/0-0-0-669.html.   
 4.  STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 344 (4th ed. 
2005). 
 5.  Id.  There are other visa types that skilled guest workers might use to come to the 
US.  The North American Free Trade Agreement led to the creation of some other types of 
visas, for example.  See supra note 3, for a catalog of nonimmigrant visas.   
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bachelor’s or higher degree in the specific specialty (or its equivalent) as a 
minimum for entry into the occupation in the United States.”
6
  Potential 
H1-B visa recipients can qualify in four ways:  possession of (1) a U.S. 
bachelors or higher degree required by the specialty occupation, (2) an 
equivalent foreign degree, (3) an unrestricted state license to fully practice 
a specialty occupation, or (4) specialized training or experience equivalent 
to a U.S. degree along with work experience.
7
 
Potential H1-B recipients must also affirm that they intend to depart 
the U.S. at the end of their visa’s duration, as long as it is not extended.  
The potential recipient’s “intent to leave,” however, is not subject to 
verification by enforcement officials because of the concept of “dual 
intent.”  Dual intent allows H1-B visa holders to pursue permanent green 
cards while in the US on their temporary visa.  This means, for example, 
that entrants on H1-B visas are not required to maintain residences abroad 
while in the United States.
8
 
U.S. employers also play an important role in the H1-B process as 
petitions require employer sponsorship,
9
 and the sponsoring employer must 
pay a fee to the government.
10
  Furthermore, the employer must verify that 
the petitioner they are sponsoring will receive the prevailing wage and 
working conditions afforded to similar employees in the employer’s 
industry.
11
  An applicant cannot receive a visa if there is a labor dispute 
with existing employees at the sponsoring employer’s company, such as a 
strike or lockout.
12
  Furthermore, the employer may face financial penalties 
and a suspension of sponsorship ability should they be involved in a 
fraudulent petition.
13
 
The number of H1-B visas is capped at 65,000 per fiscal year, with an 
additional 20,000 visas granted to graduates of U.S. technical schools.
14
  
This ceiling stands as a bar to many potential immigrants.  In 2009, U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) received 163,000 petitions for 
H1-B visas—well above the cap.
15
  Indeed, the overload of petitions has 
reached the point that CIS proposed a rule that would create a waitlist to 
 
 6.  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(3)(A), (B) (2012). 
 7.  8 C.F.R. § 214.2 (h)(4)(iii)(C).  See also RICHARD STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION 
LAW, § 3:14 (2d ed. 2012) (explaining qualification requirements). 
 8.  Austin T. Fragomen et al., Requirements for H-1B classification—Nonimmigrant 
intent exemption, 1 IMMIGR. LAW & BUS., § 6:6, (2d ed. 2012). 
 9.  Id. at § 6:12. 
 10.  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (c)(9)(A) (2012). 
 11.  Fragomen, supra note 8, at § 6:9. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (c)(14)(A) (2012). 
 14.  H-1B Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Cap Season, U.S. C.I.S., 
http://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-
and-fashion-models/h-1b-fiscal-year-fy-2014-cap-season (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
 15.  Fragomen, supra note 8, at § 6:8. 
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avoid problems when the cap is reached on the first day petitions can be 
filed.
16
 
B. The Policy Behind the Guest Worker Program 
As a policy matter, H1-B and other temporary work visa programs are 
supported because employers claim that they cannot find suitable domestic-
resident candidates for open positions.
17
  Foreign workers play an important 
role in industries such as the high tech sector, where graduates with 
science, technology, math and engineering backgrounds (STEM 
backgrounds) are in high demand.  Anecdotally, foreign-born entrepreneurs 
founded each of Yahoo, Google, and eBay.
18
  The numbers tell a similar 
story.  One study found that, in 1998, Chinese and Indian engineers held 
senior executive positions at “one-quarter of Silicon Valley’s new 
technology businesses,” generating “$16.8 billion in sales and creating 
58,282 jobs” that year alone.
19
 
Another quantitative way of analyzing foreign STEM workers’ impact 
on the U.S. economy is by looking at their contribution to intellectual 
property development.  One study estimated that 24.2% of all international 
patent applications filed in 2006 with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
came from immigrants in the U.S. who are not citizens.
20
  Given this 
backdrop, perhaps it is less surprising that the Obama administration 
believes that skilled immigrants boosted U.S. GDP by 1.4%-2.4% in the 
 
 16.  Registration Requirement for Petitioners Seeking to File H–1B Petitions on Behalf 
of Aliens Subject to the Numerical Limitations, 76 Fed. Reg. 11686 (proposed Mar. 3, 
2011) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 214 and 299). 
 17.  Neil G. Ruiz et al., The Search for Skills: Demand for H1-B Workers in U.S. 
Metropolitan Areas, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT BROOKINGS (July 18, 2012), at 2, 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2012/7/18-h1b-visas-labor-
immigration/18-h1b-visas-labor-immigration.pdf. 
 18.  Jon Swartz, Tech Talents from India, Other Countries Leaving Silicon Valley, USA 
TODAY, May 11, 2011, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2011-05-
10-tech-talents-leave-silicon-valley_n.htm; see also AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s 
New Entrepreneurs, (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal.), June 1999, at 89, available at 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf (providing a table listing influential 
immigrants and their positions at Silicon Valley tech companies).  
 19.  Id. at viii.  These numbers include aliens present in the United States on variety of 
different visas, so they should not be taken as signifying the economic contribution of H1-B 
workers alone.  However, it is safe to assume that H1-B workers contribute to part of this 
growth. 
 20.  Wadhwa, et al., America’s New Immigrant Entrepreneurs, DUKE MASTER OF 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PROGRAM and UC BERKELEY SCHOOL OF INFORMATION 27 (Jan. 
4, 2007), 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/Americas_new_immigrant_entrepreneurs_I
.pdf. 
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1990s.
21
  This type of data also helps explain the push to expand the current 
H1-B program to encourage more skilled immigrants to bring their skills to 
the U.S. 
Employers in the high tech industry have been vocal in support of 
expanding access to temporary work visas.  Bill Gates, for instance, has 
voiced his support.
22
  Lobbying groups such as The Internet Association are 
also pushing for a higher cap on H1-B visas.
23
  Raising the cap on 
temporary work visas seems to have bipartisan support in Congress and 
will likely be a part of any immigration reform package that becomes law.
24
 
C. Disagreement with the Program 
The H1-B program is not without its detractors, who argue that the 
main goal of employers is to take jobs away from Americans in favor of 
underpaid foreign workers.
25
  There is some data to support this position.  
One study found that computer professionals present in the U.S. on new 
H1-B visas were making 25% less than their counterparts with U.S. 
citizenship.
26
  Another concluded that H1-B admissions are associated with 
a five to six percent drop in wages for computer programmers and systems 
analysts.
27
 
Explaining this phenomenon, one academic faults the government’s 
definition of “prevailing wage,” which imposes a floor on wages for guest 
 
 21.  THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 24 (May 
201l), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf. 
 22.  Anne Broach, Bill Gates to Congress: Let Us Hire More Foreigners, CNET NEWS  
(Mar. 12, 2008), http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9892046-7.html. 
 23.  Michael Beckerman, Changing face of America increases urgency for STEM 
immigration reform, THE INTERNET ASSOCIATION (Nov. 27, 2012), 
http://internetassociation.org/changing-face-of-america-increases-urgency-for-stem-
immigration-reform/ (The internet association is a lobbying group representing high tech 
companies.  This type of op-ed is an example of their push for changes to the current 
system).   
 24.  Matt O’Brien, Summary of the Immigration Innovation Act of 2013, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.mercurynews.com/top-stories/ci_22473314/high-
tech-immigrant-reform-bill-would-bring-more. 
 25.  See e.g., Jennifer Epstein, President Obama Google+ Chat Gets Personal, 
POLITICO (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72185.html (in 
particular, see video exchange embedded in body of text). 
 26.  RON HIRA, ECON. POLICY INST., THE H-1B AND L-1 VISA PROGRAMS OUT OF 
CONTROL, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #280 11 (Econ. Policy Inst.), Oct. 14, 2010. 
 27.  Jennifer Dorning and Charlie Fanning, Gaming the System 2012: Guest Worker 
Visa Programs and Professional and Technical Workers in the U.S., DEPARTMENT FOR 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 34 (2012), available at http://dpeaflcio.org/wp-
content/uploads/Gaming-the-System-2012-Revised.pdf. 
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worker employees, claiming it is “riddled with loopholes.”
28
  There is no 
“labor market test” to determine the prevailing wage; instead the 
government relies on surveys selected or conducted by employers.
29
  This 
means that a skilled nonimmigrant with significant experience that would 
merit a high salary in the U.S. labor market could be offered a lower salary 
based on the average pay for the position he is being offered.  Given that 
employer support is required for a nonimmigrant to receive a visa, the labor 
market may not be working efficiently, either for domestic or foreign 
workers.  Furthermore, some contend that the visa program helps 
employers select away from older American workers, who bring more costs 
to businesses.
30
  Other scholars who support the program contest these 
arguments.
31
 
D. Attempts to Undermine the Program at the State Level 
Regardless of the overall merits of the policy, the discontent many 
individuals feel toward the program could provide a motive for state 
governments to pass or maintain legislation that attempts to undermine the 
program and protect the state’s domestic workforce.  One avenue for 
opponents of the program to adopt would be to restrict the issuance of 
professional licenses to only citizens and legal permanent residents. 
States require that individuals obtain professional licenses before 
entering a variety of professions to assure others of their competence.
32
  A 
surprising number of fields are subject to such regulations, extending 
beyond what one would traditionally assume would be regulated.
33
  For 
example, Louisiana requires that even florists pass an exam and pay a fee 
 
 28.  Vivek Wadhwa, America’s Other Immigration Crisis, THE AMERICAN (July 2008) 
http://www.american.com/archive/2008/july-august-magazine-contents/ 
america2019s-other-immigration-crisis. 
 29.  Dorning and Fanning, supra note 27, at 35.  Consider also that employers are not 
required to make the wages they pay to H1-B employees public.  The documentation an 
employer provides to the agency to support its compliance with the prevailing wage 
requirement is considered confidential.  Santiglia v. Sun Microsystems, US Dept. of Labor 
Administrative Review Board, Case No. 2003-LCA-2 (2005). 
 30.  Patrick Thibodeau, Norman Matloff Tells What’s Wrong with the H-1B Visa 
Program, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 8, 2008), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/323943/Norman_Matloff?taxonomyId=13&pageN
umber=1. 
 31.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 364-65. 
 32.  See Dick M. Carpenter et al., License to Work: A National of Burdens from 
Occupational Licensing, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (May 2012), available at 
https://www.ij.org/images/pdf_folder/economic_liberty/occupational_licensing/licensetowor
k.pdf (comparing the professional licensure requirements of the fifty states and highlighting 
requirements in unexpected industries). 
 33.  Id. 
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in order to obtain a license.
34
  Software engineers may soon face state 
licensure requirements as well.
35
  Limiting these types of licenses to 
citizens or permanent residents could affect how labor markets function in 
states that are concerned about an influx of foreign workers. 
If a patchwork of state licensure bans are permissible, companies 
would have to think about locating personnel in states that do not interfere 
with their efforts to hire nonimmigrants.  Companies usually prefer uniform 
regulation as it lowers costs and complexity.
36
  The constitutionality of such 
state level legislation as applied to skilled guest workers thus looms large 
for businesses and workers alike as Congress contemplates allowing even 
more guest workers to enter the United States. 
E.  A Refresher on Constitutional ‘levels of scrutiny’ 
When a court considers whether or not a challenged law violates the 
Equal Protection Clause, it must first decide how much deference it should 
give to the legislative branch that adopted the law.  This is often discussed 
as the “level of scrutiny” the court is applying.  Courts often adopt a highly 
deferential approach called rational basis review that asks only whether 
there is a legitimate government interest underlying the law before 
upholding it or striking it down.
37
  Other times courts will adopt strict 
scrutiny, a highly skeptical approach that asks whether the law is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
38
  Intermediate standards that 
fall somewhere in between these two approaches are available as well.
39
  
Once the court decides how closely to scrutinize a law, it then proceeds to 
do so and decides whether or not to uphold it. 
 
 34.  Id. at 30.  
 35.  Kathy Kowalenko, Licensing Software Engineers Is in the Works, THE INSTITUTE 
(Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://theinstitute.ieee.org/career-and-education/career-
guidance/licensing-software-engineers-is-in-the-works. 
 36.  See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, The patchwork of regulations entangling Square, and 
every American internet startup that takes money, QUARTZ (Mar. 14, 2013), 
http://qz.com/62265/why-square-and-seven-other-finance-start-ups-got-run-out-of-illinois/ 
(discussing the challenges some start up payment companies are facing when dealing with 
varying types of state level banking regulations in the United States, as opposed to the 
uniform system Europe has in place). 
 37.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (providing an 
example of rational basis review in action). 
 38.  See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (discussing how 
legal restrictions that curtail the rights of a single racial group are subject to “the most rigid 
scrutiny”).  Korematsu is an outlier, in that the law at issue was upheld despite the 
application of strict scrutiny. 
 39.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to a law that discriminates based on gender).  
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II. LEGAL ISSUES 
A. Do State Licensure Bans Violate the Equal Protection Clause? 
State licensure bans that discriminate against all nonimmigrants 
violate the Equal Protection Clause when they are applied to skilled guest 
workers who have permission to reside in the United States.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution states that “[n]o state shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”
40
  As the Supreme Court has noted, the clause uses the word 
“person” instead of “citizen,” which means it protects aliens as well.
41
 
This section points out that because aliens lack a vote, and thus a 
voice in the political process, courts must step in to protect their interests 
when states adopt laws that discriminate against them.  Skilled workers 
admitted to the United States with permission to reside contribute 
substantially to our economy.  They have followed our immigration laws.  
Some have lived here for years and plan on staying legally in the United 
States even after the expiration of their current visas.  The Fifth Circuit 
decision not to protect these individuals against a discriminatory state law 
was incorrect, and while the Second Circuit’s contrary decision may have 
slightly overstated its case, it arrived at the correct conclusion. 
1. Background Supreme Court Decisions 
A long line of Supreme Court cases hold that strict scrutiny is applied 
to state laws that broadly discriminate against all aliens, including aliens 
who are legal permanent residents.
42
  This approach can be traced back at 
least as far as Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, which held that it 
was unconstitutional for California to refuse to grant commercial fishing 
licenses to aliens who were ineligible for citizenship.
43
  The Court’s 
approach to equal protection cases involving aliens was cemented in the 
seminal case Graham v. Richardson, which held that “[a]liens . . . are a 
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular minority’.”
44
  Applying strict 
 
 40.  U.S. CONST. art. XIV, cl. 1. 
 41.  Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35-36 (1915). 
 42.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1352. 
 43.  Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948).   
 44.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (finding that a class of 
individuals constitutes a discreet and insular minority that lack political power is a trigger 
for courts to scrutinize state laws that affect them as a class more closely, in accord with the 
precedent set in United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).  Without 
political influence, minority groups are subject to the arbitrary prejudices of the rest of the 
population, and must rely on the judicial system for protection.  A key question is whether 
the skilled guest workers in these cases should qualify as a discreet and insular minority, or 
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scrutiny review, Graham held that it was impermissible for states to 
condition welfare benefits on U.S. citizenship, or to require that aliens live 
in the United States for a certain number of years in order to qualify for 
benefits.
45
 
The Court continued to apply heightened scrutiny in subsequent cases 
where states prohibited all noncitizens from obtaining professional licenses.  
In Application of Griffiths, the Court struck down a Connecticut bar rule 
that prohibited all noncitizens from sitting for the state’s bar exam.
46
  It also 
followed this approach in Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & 
Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, striking down a Puerto Rico law that 
prohibited noncitizens from obtaining engineering licenses.
47
 
Complicating matters, the status of Graham, Griffiths, and Flores was 
cast into doubt by a series of cases that followed.  These subsequent cases 
found their roots in Sugarman v. Dougall, a contemporary of Graham, 
where the Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in “limiting 
participation in [its] government to those who are within the basic 
conception of a political community.”
48
  The thrust of this line of cases was 
that state laws that discriminated against aliens were to be analyzed under a 
preemption approach rather than an equal protection approach.  Analyzing 
the disputes on preemption grounds arguably placed these disputes on more 
favorable terrain for the states. 
After Sugarman, the Court subsequently held that it is constitutional 
for states to prevent aliens from participating in certain professions that 
“implicate[] the ‘political function’” of the state.
49
  Foley also contained 
language that tried to cabin Graham, and Griffiths as preemption cases 
rather than equal protection cases.
50
  It did not overrule Graham, however, 
 
should be treated differently. 
 45.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 372.  
 46.  Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). 
 47.  Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero 426 U.S. 572, 
605 (1976). 
 48.  Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973).  Sugarman struck down a New 
York law that prohibited aliens from serving in the state’s civil service system.  Id. 
 49.  Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 298 (1978); LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1353.  In 
Foley, the Court held that it was permissible for states to prohibit noncitizens from serving 
in New York’s state police force.  Foley, 435 U.S. at 291. 
 50.  Id. at 295.  Specifically the Court said:  “Following Graham, a series of decisions 
has resulted requiring state action to meet close scrutiny to exclude aliens as a class . . . .  
These exclusions struck at the noncitizens’ ability to exist in the community, a position 
seemingly inconsistent with the congressional determination to admit the alien to permanent 
residence.” Id.  This attempt to cabin Graham as a preemption case is somewhat 
strengthened by Mathews v. Diaz, which upheld a federal law that conferred benefits 
differently based on alienage. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).  However, this 
Comment addresses state, not federal law, so Diaz is not particularly relevant.  As the Court 
noted in Diaz, “equal protection analysis . . . involves significantly different considerations” 
when “it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than between aliens 
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leaving its status an open question.  The Court later expanded its political 
function exception to Graham to include professions that involve a state’s 
“sovereign functions.”
51
  States were now able to prohibit noncitizens from 
working as public school teachers and probation officers.
52
  The Supreme 
Court’s diverging opinions in all of these cases reflect significant divisions 
on the Court.
53
  However, the justices supporting Graham’s equal 
protection approach appeared to prevail when, in an 8-1 decision in Bernal 
v. Fainter, the Court struck down a Texas law that prevented aliens from 
becoming notaries public.
54
  Justice Marshall’s decision construed the 
political function exception to Graham narrowly. Id.  Sugarman was the 
exception to Graham’s adoption of strict scrutiny, not the other way 
around. Id.  This Comment proceeds from the premise that Foley’s attempt 
to cabin Graham, Griffiths etc. as preemption cases failed.   
Assuming that state laws that discriminate against all aliens will be 
strictly scrutinized under the Equal Protection Clause, another question 
remains:  what level of scrutiny is applied to state laws that discriminate 
against subsets of the alien class—as opposed to the class as a whole?  The 
closest the Court has come to addressing this question was in Nyquist v. 
Mauclet.
55
  In that decision, the Court held that it was unconstitutional for 
New York to require legal permanent residents to state that they intended to 
apply for United States citizenship in order to qualify for state tuition 
assistance.
56
  By imposing this requirement, the state was denying benefits 
to a segment of legal permanent residents who were content with their 
current status and did not want to apply for citizenship.
57
  The Court held 
that the law still discriminated against the alien class even though it only 
affected certain members of the class.
58
  Notably, the Court stated that it 
was impermissible for states to adopt discriminatory statutes whose 
 
and the Federal Government.”  Id. at 84-85. 
 51.  LEGOMSKY, supra note 4, at 1353. 
 52.  Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 
(1979). 
 53.  See Michael Cornelius Kelly, A Wavering Course: United States Supreme Court 
Treatment of State Laws Regarding Aliens in the Twentieth Century, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
701, 729-38 (2011) (discussing the dividing lines on the court that help explain these dual, 
conflicting strings of opinions). 
 54.  Id. at 737, (citing Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984)).  This Comment proceeds 
from the premise that Foley’s attempt to cabin Graham, Griffiths etc. as preemption cases 
failed.  In Bernal, Justice Marshall construed the political function exception to Graham 
narrowly. Id.  Sugarman was the exception to Graham’s adoption of strict scrutiny, not the 
other way around. Id. 
 55.  Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 8-9. 
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purpose was to detect an alien’s “degree of national affinity.”
59
  However, 
the case again involved a statute that discriminated against legal permanent 
residents, so extending it to protect nonimmigrants is not a certain 
proposition. 
Graham itself can be read in different ways, making it challenging to 
definitively apply it to the question of how courts ought to approach state 
laws that discriminate against subsets of the alien class, like 
nonimmigrants.  The decision used the broad term “aliens” to describe the 
protected class, which seems to include nonimmigrants.  However, the 
Court was only addressing a controversy involving legal permanent 
residents, and its ultimate holding pertained only to “resident aliens.”
60
  
Furthermore, the decision included an observation that aliens are similar to 
citizens in that “[a]liens like citizens pay taxes and may be called into the 
armed forces [and] may live within a state for many years . . . and 
contribute to the economic growth of the state.”
61
  This suggests that an 
alien’s connection to the community is a relevant consideration for courts 
considering equal protection challenges, and calls into question efforts to 
extend Graham to cover all aliens regardless of their relationship to the 
community. 
The Supreme Court has also held that state laws targeting 
undocumented immigrants receive less scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause than those that broadly discriminate against aliens regardless of their 
legal status.  In Plyer v. Doe, the Supreme Court applied heighted rational 
basis review to a Texas law that excluded undocumented immigrant 
children from public schools.
62
  Where the Court would draw the line and 
stop strictly scrutinizing discriminatory state laws as applied to skilled 
guest workers with temporary visas remains an open question and has 
created a division amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal. 
2. The Circuit Split 
As noted above, the Fifth and Second Circuits have disagreed about 
how to apply these cases to the question of whether courts ought to strictly 
 
 59.  Id. at 10. 
 60.  Graham specifically held: “Accordingly, we hold that a state statute that denies 
welfare benefits to resident aliens and one that denies them to aliens who have not resided 
in the United States for a specified number of years violate the Equal Protection Clause.”  
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (emphasis added).  As is noted below, 
what the term “resident alien” is referring to is ambiguous.  It could be denoting permanent 
residents, or it could be denoting a distinction found in the US tax code.  It could also 
simply mean anyone who lives in the United States.  Infra note 103. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).  The Court struck down the exclusion. Id. 
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scrutinize state laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants.
63
  The Fifth 
Circuit adopted minimal rational basis review, arguing that nonimmigrants 
are transients, and declined to strike down a state rule that prohibited 
nonimmigrants from sitting for the Louisiana bar exam.  The Second 
Circuit applied strict scrutiny and struck down a New York statute that 
prohibited nonimmigrants from obtaining a license to practice pharmacy.  
The courts disagreed about whether or not nonimmigrants were transients, 
and thus had insufficient connections to the community to warrant judicial 
protection.  They also disagreed about whether this was relevant under the 
case law outlined above. 
a. The Fifth Circuit Applies Rational Basis Review 
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit analyzed a Louisiana Supreme 
Court rule that prohibited nonimmigrants from sitting for the state’s bar 
exam.
64
  In a 2-1 decision, the court held that strict scrutiny applies only to 
state laws that discriminate against legal permanent residents (LPRs), and 
not to laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants.
65
  Furthermore, the 
court declined to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny or a heightened 
rational basis review.
66
  Applying minimal rational basis review, the court 
upheld the state’s rule.
67
  Judge Stewart dissented from the majority’s equal 
protection analysis, and the Circuit’s decision to deny a rehearing en banc 
drew further dissent.
68
 
The majority opinion drew a line excluding nonimmigrants from 
heightened court protection because the majority felt the transience of 
nonimmigrants distinguished them from the legal permanent residents the 
Supreme Court had before them in Graham and Griffiths.
69
  The opinion 
noted that in Plyer, the Court had applied only heightened rational basis 
review, which demonstrated that strict scrutiny is not appropriate for every 
challenge to a discriminatory state law targeting subsets of the alien class.
70
 
 
 63.  The Sixth Circuit has adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach, upholding a Tennessee 
law that required a person to be a citizen or a legal permanent resident in order to obtain a 
driver’s license.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 
2007).  In an effort to maintain a focus on employment law issues, this Comment focuses on 
the other two Circuit opinions. 
 64.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005).  The case arose when six foreign 
lawyers were denied permission to sit for the state’s bar exam.  Recent Cases, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 669, 676 n. 63 (2005).  Two suits were filed.  LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 405.   
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at 426 (Stewart, J., dissenting); LeClerc, 444 F.3d at 428 (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
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The majority also noted that the Supreme Court has never invalidated 
a state law discriminating against nonimmigrants under the Equal 
Protection Clause, or applied strict scrutiny to such a law.
71
  It further 
observed that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to do so in one case 
but invalidated the law on preemption grounds without addressing the 
equal protection issue.
72
  Looking at the body of Supreme Court opinions 
on equal protection alienage claims, the opinion states that two concerns 
underlie the Supreme Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny in cases such 
as Graham and Griffiths:  “(1) the inability of resident aliens to exert 
political power in their own interest given their status as virtual citizens; 
and (2) the similarity of resident aliens and citizens.”
73
  The opinion noted 
that in Griffiths, the Supreme Court had compared resident aliens’ 
contributions to society, including service in the armed forces, participation 
in the economy, and their tax obligations to those of full citizens.
74
 
The opinion also cited a law review article by David Martin, a 
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, which argues that courts 
should apply different levels of scrutiny based on an alien’s connection to 
the community in which they live.
75
  An idea of reciprocity is at play here, 
namely that an immigrant who respectfully contributes to the community 
should receive more protection from courts than one who contributes 
little.
76
  Martin’s proposed hierarchy would place legal permanent residents 
at the top and undocumented immigrants at the bottom, with 
nonimmigrants somewhere in the middle.
77
  The article suggests these 
umbrella groups are appropriate proxies for ascertaining an individual’s 
connection to the community because legal statutes outline the ways in 
which members can contribute to the community, what members are 
entitled to, and how long they can stay.
78
  These statutory umbrella groups 
also indicate whether or not an individual has abided by our country’s 
 
 71.  Id. at 416. 
 72.  Id., citing Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
 73.  Id. at 417. 
 74.  Id. at 418, citing Application of Griffiths, 413 U.S., 717722 (1973). 
 75.  Id. at 425 n.55. 
 76.  David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: 
The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2001).  As Martin put it: 
Aliens . . . may be members of a relevant community they share with citizens, 
and are thus entitled to the respect of certain rights and subject to certain 
reciprocal duties.  But there are different levels of membership . . . and 
additional reciprocal duties and rights, or at least more stringent protections of 
rights, will come into being for persons as they move to higher circles of 
membership.  
Id. at 89. 
 77.  Id. at 95-96. 
 78.  Id. 
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immigration laws.
79
 
Adopting this approach, the Fifth Circuit considered ways in which 
nonimmigrants differ from citizens in how they relate to the community.  
Holding that nonimmigrants deserve less protection than legal permanent 
residents and citizens, the court pointed out that nonimmigrants are not 
allowed to serve in the military, and are subject to different tax treatment 
than citizens.
80
  Rejecting strict scrutiny, the Fifth Circuit also refused to 
apply an intermediate level of scrutiny or heightened rational basis 
review.
81
  The court distinguished the Plyer case, where the Supreme Court 
adopted heightened rational basis review when analyzing a law that 
discriminated against the children of undocumented immigrants as sui 
generis.
82
  The court noted that the decision involved the Supreme Court’s 
deep sympathy for children who were not culpable for their plight and were 
facing the prospect of an inadequate education.
83
  The court held that 
professionals residing here on a work visa knew they were going to face 
restrictions when they came to the United States, and are thus entitled to 
less court protection than the children in Plyer.
84
  Ultimately, applying 
standard rational basis review, the court upheld Louisiana’s bar rule.
85
  It 
held that Louisiana had a legitimate state interest in regulating the legal 
profession, and that having the ability to locate attorneys under its 
jurisdiction helped ensure “continuity and accountability.”
86
  The court 
noted the state’s concern that a “malfeasant or nonfeasant” nonimmigrant 
attorney could flee the United States to avoid accountability.
87
  The court 
further held that it could not rule that the law was irrationally overinclusive 
since it was not the court’s place to substitute its opinion on a law’s 
wisdom for the perception of its drafters under standard rational basis 
review.
88
 
b. The Second Circuit Applies Strict Scrutiny 
The Second Circuit rejected the Fifth Circuit’s approach and applied 
strict scrutiny.
89
  The court essentially provided four grounds for its 
 
 79.  Id.  The article divides undocumented immigrants into three more categories. Id. 
 80.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 418 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 81.  Id. at 419-20. 
 82.  Id. at 420. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 421. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 422. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 76 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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decision.
90
  First, the court rejected the idea that an alien’s degree of 
connection to the community was a relevant consideration for courts.
91
  
Second, the court pointed out that all aliens, including nonimmigrants, lack 
political clout, which is the basis for court protection.
92
  Third, the court 
stated that the nonimmigrant litigants before it were so similar to citizens 
that, even assuming for the sake of argument such a comparison was a 
relevant consideration, strict scrutiny would still be appropriate.
93
  Finally, 
the court seemed to believe that the legal status of the litigants before it 
meant they needed greater protection from courts than those afforded 
undocumented children in Plyer.
94
 
Looking at the first--and critical-- issue of societal contributions, the 
court construed the body of Supreme Court precedent differently than the 
Fifth Circuit.  According to the Second Circuit, Graham’s discussion of the 
similarities between legal permanent residents and citizens was simply 
included to provide a response to the state’s arguments that its statute 
served a compelling state interest.
95
  The Second Circuit did not view it as 
establishing a litmus test that courts could use to decide what level of 
scrutiny to adopt.
96
  The court narrowly construed Foley and the subsequent 
cases that created room for states to discriminate against aliens in an effort 
to create a “political community,” that could have buttressed the argument 
that an exception to strict scrutiny should be carved out for nonimmigrants 
as well.
97
  According to the Second Circuit, the Foley exception to strict 
scrutiny only pertained to discriminatory state employment laws that 
involved “important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial 
positions” involving public policy.
98
  Thus, the Second Circuit considered it 
inapplicable to the case before it.
99
 
The Second Circuit viewed the scrutiny determination as revolving 
around political clout.
100
  Since nonimmigrants are arguably even less 
 
 90.  Id. at 75. 
 91.  Id.  LeClerc actually quoted Griffiths in support of its conclusion that it should 
assess the contributions a nonimmigrant makes to the community before determining what 
level of scrutiny to apply to laws that discriminate against them.  See LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 
418.  This does not really change the argument, but it could be confusing to readers 
comparing both opinions. 
 92.  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 75. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 78. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 73-74. 
 98.  Id.  This is not an entirely fair reading of the case law, as the exception outlined in 
Foley did expand somewhat in subsequent cases to include the execution of sovereign 
functions.  See supra notes 51 and 52 and accompanying text (discussing this expansion). 
 99.  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 73-74. 
 100.  Id. at 77. 
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politically influential than legal permanent residents who have roots here, 
the Second Circuit held that they should be afforded heightened court 
protection.
101
 
Even if the differences between nonimmigrants and citizens’ societal 
contributions were an important factor, the Second Circuit would have 
reached the same conclusion.
102
  The court noted that nonimmigrants pay 
taxes on income earned in the United States, and that the doctrine of dual 
intent means that many nonimmigrant aliens who are supposedly here on a 
temporary basis will actually stay here for many years afterwards.
103
 
The court did not leave it at that, however.  It made a determination 
that Plyer compelled it to apply at least heightened basis review to claims 
brought by lawfully admitted nonimmigrants.
104
  Recall that in Plyer, the 
Supreme Court had applied heightened rational basis review to claims 
brought by the children of undocumented immigrants regarding their 
education.
105
  The Second Circuit stated that applying heightened rational 
basis review to some undocumented aliens while applying only standard 
rational basis review to lawfully admitted nonimmigrants would create an 
“odd, some might say absurd result[].”
106
  It called such an outcome 
“illogical,” and stated that it would “clearly contradict the federal 
government’s determination as to which individuals have a legal right to be 
here.”
107
 
The Second Circuit decided to apply strict scrutiny to the New York 
statute.
108
  It held that New York’s licensure ban did not serve a compelling 
state interest and was not narrowly tailored, and thus violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.
109
  The court observed that there was no evidence that 
transient pharmacists were endangering the public health, and that even if 
this were a problem, malpractice insurance would be a more appropriate 
solution.
110
 
 
 101.  Id. at 77. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  Whether or not an individual is considered a “resident alien” is an important 
tax consideration, but nonimmigrants can be considered “resident aliens” for the purposes of 
taxation.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 427 n.1 (5th Cir. 2005) (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
Nonimmigrant aliens are treated the same as legal permanent residents for taxation purposes 
if they are in the United States “at least 31 calendar days during the course of the year” and 
183 days over the course of the previous three years. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 
7701(b)(3)(2010)).  This adds further ambiguity to Graham’s holding, since the court stated 
that strict scrutiny applied in order to protect “resident aliens.” 
 104.  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at at 78. 
 105.  Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
 106.  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 78. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 79. 
 110.  Id. 
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c. Analysis 
Strict scrutiny should often be applied to state laws that discriminate 
against the umbrella of aliens who are classified as nonimmigrants when 
they come up in as applied challenges.  The Fifth Circuit’s argument that 
an alien’s connection to the community should be a consideration for 
determining which level of scrutiny to apply has some intuitive appeal.  
However, it has little basis in precedent, and its use of the nonimmigrant 
umbrella as a proxy for transience shows how it will often fail in practice.  
While many nonimmigrants may only be present in the United States 
briefly, those who choose to stay contribute significantly to our 
communities and deserve judicial protection. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed what 
level of scrutiny to apply when considering state laws targeting 
nonimmigrants instead of legal permanent residents.  However, in Graham 
and Nyquist, laws that discriminated against a subset of the alien class were 
held to be unconstitutional because they discriminated against the class as a 
whole.
111
  Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Foley seems 
questionable, given the Court’s decision reaffirming a broad reading of 
Graham in Bernal. 
Regardless, Foley does not provide the support the Fifth Circuit needs 
to establish that nonimmigrants should be handled differently than 
permanent residents.  Foley suggested that strict scrutiny was applied in 
Graham because states were adopting laws that conflicted with the federal 
government’s grant of an offer to reside in the United States.
112
  Yet the 
state laws discriminating against nonimmigrants do the same thing.  The 
umbrella of nonimmigrants includes skilled workers who have been offered 
the chance to work and live in the United States for years.  Foley would 
only provide support for a state law that discriminated against a class of 
immigrants who received no offer of residence from the federal 
government.  The Supreme Court case law does not clearly and 
unambiguously support the “contributions to society” inquiry the Fifth 
Circuit decided to undertake, and until it does, it would be precarious to 
assume that it is appropriate.  Setting aside the issue of precedent, it is not 
clear that courts should be deciding whether one group of aliens living in 
the United States is somehow more American than another group, a 
troubling conclusion for many readers looking at a court’s decision in this 
area. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the level of review 
 
 111.  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 
(1977). 
 112.  Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295 (1978). 
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should depend on an alien’s contributions to society, strict scrutiny is 
appropriate because skilled workers within the nonimmigrant umbrella are 
contributing substantially to this country’s economic development and 
innovative spirit.  The introduction to this comment highlighted the impact, 
represented as an estimated percentage, that skilled immigrants have on 
gross domestic product, and discussed skilled immigrants’ significant 
contributions to the development of new technologies.  The Second Circuit 
did a good job of highlighting some of the formal legal designations that 
apply to this group of aliens.  Under federal tax law, an alien’s 
contributions to the public depends not on whether or not they are a 
nonimmigrant, but on how many days they have spent in the United States 
over the previous three years.
113
  Thus many nonimmigrants are 
contributing to the United States treasury, even though they do not have the 
chance to vote. 
In addition, the doctrine of dual intent creates the possibility that many 
skilled immigrants will legally stay in the United States after the expiration 
of their visa.
114
  There are some statistics, however, that lend credence to 
the Fifth Circuit’s concerns about transience.  AnnaLee Saxenian’s article 
Silicon Valley’s New Entrepreneurs, noted in the introduction, provides 
valuable insight into the nonimmigrant experience.
115
  She argues that her 
data show that it is incorrect to assume that nonimmigrants will stay 
permanently in the United States.
116
 
She found that an average of 47% of the 1990-1991 foreign doctoral 
recipients in science and engineering were still working in the United 
States in 1995.
117
  This varied significantly based on the student’s country 
of origin.  For instance, 88% of Chinese and 79% of Indian doctoral 
recipients stayed in the United States until 1995, while only 13% and 11% 
of Japanese and South Korean doctoral recipients, respectively, remained 
that long.
118
 
Nevertheless, Saxenian noted that skilled immigrants who do stay 
“play a critical role as middlemen linking businesses in the United States to 
those in geographically distant regions.”
119
  The fact that some skilled 
immigrants stay while others leave simply highlights how precarious it is to 
 
 113.  See supra text accompanying note 103 (discussing tax treatment of 
nonimmigrants). 
 114.  Recall from the introduction that the doctrine of dual intent means that H1-B visa 
holders can pursue permanent resident status despite having accepted a limited duration visa 
to initially enter the United States. 
 115.  AnnaLee Saxenian, Silicon Valley’s New Entrepreneurs, (Pub. Policy Inst. of Cal.), 
June 1999, at 3 n.3, available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_699ASR.pdf. 
 116.  Id. at 2-3. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
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use the nonimmigrant tag as a proxy for transience or community 
contribution.  While the idea may have theoretical appeal, the data show 
how inadequate the labels, “permanent resident” and “nonimmigrant,” are 
for achieving that task.  This also underscores an important point—these 
licensure bans may be an unconstitutional violation of equal protection as 
applied to certain subgroups of the nonimmigrant class who can 
demonstrate their contributions to American society, even as they remain 
valid as applied to say, a tourist, who also falls under the large 
“nonimmigrant” umbrella.  This comment is focused on skilled guest 
workers however, not the status of other more transient nonimmigrants. 
That being said, the rationale the Second Circuit adopted with regards 
to the Plyer decision is troubling.  The equitable arguments presented to the 
court in Plyer, those of children who have since been termed 
“Dreamers,”
120
 are substantially stronger than those that could be offered 
by a frustrated computer engineer, or recent law school graduate who 
cannot sit for the bar exam.  The Plyer decision in some respects should 
actually counsel against adopting strict scrutiny in this case, as Dreamers 
have lived in the United States for years, contribute substantially to society, 
and yet cannot vote because of a decision their parents made for them.  In a 
vacuum, they would appear to fit more easily into the “discreet and insular” 
minority description provided by Carolene Products than skilled guest 
workers.  However, the fact that the Supreme Court was willing to 
substantially penalize Dreamer petitioners in Plyer for their immigration 
status does not mean that courts ought to penalize nonimmigrants even 
more severely just to be consistent on equitable grounds.  The Supreme 
Court is evidently greatly concerned with undocumented vs. documented 
status.  Perhaps the best solution would simply be for courts to focus on 
precedent that is most on point – cases in which the Court addressed claims 
brought by documented immigrants. 
Courts should not follow the Fifth Circuit’s invitation to create 
different levels of review that hinge on whether or not an alien falls under 
the nonimmigrant umbrella.  Supreme Court precedent does not support the 
approach, and it fails to achieve its goals because the term “nonimmigrant” 
includes individuals with substantially different ties to the community.  
Courts should instead protect skilled nonimmigrant guest workers from 
laws that discriminate against them based on their status by applying strict 
scrutiny to the regulations underlying their as applied claims. 
 
120.   Who and Where the DREAMers Are, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/who-and-where-dreamers-are (last visited Feb. 
17, 2014).  
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B. Are State Licensure Bans Preempted by Federal Law? 
Setting aside the equal protection issue, state licensure bans are also 
preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act and its accompanying 
regulations.  The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution requires that state 
laws give way when Congress intends for its legislation to supersede state 
laws in the same field.
121
  Congress can make its intent clear through an 
express provision in a statute.  In the absence of such a provision, courts 
may infer Congressional intent where the federal government has passed a 
comprehensive piece of legislation in the regulatory field at issue, or where 
a state law presents a conflict with federal law that members of Congress 
could not have anticipated.
122
 
After reviewing the background cases that make up the Supreme 
Court’s relevant preemption jurisprudence, this comment explores the 
arguments of the Fifth and Second Circuit.  It then argues that the Second 
Circuit’s position was correct.  While there is no express preemption 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act, one can infer 
Congressional intent to occupy the field from the statute.  Moreover, state 
licensure bans create an obstacle to Congressional goals. 
1. Background Cases 
The concept of preemption seems straightforward at first glance.
123
  
Federalism recognizes that both the states and the federal government 
“have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.”
124
  However, 
a dilemma emerges when state and federal law are at odds with one 
another.  The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides a solution to 
this problem, stating that the “Constitution, and Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of 
the Land . . . any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”
125
  Thus state laws that conflict or displace 
federal laws are invalid.
126
  When a court analyzes whether or not a federal 
 
 121.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 122.  See Preemption, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE (Aug. 19, 2012, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption (explaining, defining, and giving examples of 
preemption in federal law). 
 123.  See Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for law students: Preemption and the Arizona 
Immigration Law, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 9, 2011, 1:37 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/12/scotus-for-law-students-preemption-and-the-arizona-
immigration-law/ (explaining preemption in context of the Arizona immigration law and 
showing how preemption might seem simple but can become complex in application).  
 124.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012). 
 125.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 126.  The concept of preemption dates back to the early years of the republic.  See e.g., 
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law preempts a state law, it is investigating Congressional intent in crafting 
the federal law. 
Preemption breaks into two categories:  express, and implied.  Where 
a federal statute includes an express preemption clause, state statutes that 
fall within the clause are preempted, because Congressional intent is 
clear.
127
  In situations where no express preemption clause is included in the 
federal statute or where it is inapplicable, courts may still find that the 
federal law implies that the state law is preempted.
128
  This occurs when 
Congress has passed such a comprehensive statute that one may infer that 
Congress intended to occupy the field on its own without state level 
supplementation, or where the state law conflicts with the federal law.
129
 
If the alleged conflict occurs in a field that states have traditionally 
occupied, courts start with the presumption that the state law is not 
preempted and look to see if the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress” 
is to the contrary.
130
  Two Supreme Court decisions, De Canas v. Bica, and 
Toll v. Moreno, contain similarities with the issues presented by state 
nonimmigrant licensure bans. 
In De Canas, the Court upheld a California statute that prohibited an 
employer from “knowingly employ[ing] an alien who is not entitled to 
lawful residence in the United States if such employment would have an 
adverse effect on lawful resident workers.”
131
  The Court’s decision 
addressed whether or not Congress had occupied the field of immigration 
law, such that state laws governing the employment of illegal aliens were 
impermissible.  The Court held that the California statute fell within the 
state’s traditional police power to regulate the “employment relationship” 
 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (applying 
the Supremacy Clause to disputes of federal versus state law).  Concern about crafting a 
cohesive foreign policy was one of the original justifications for the supremacy clause.  
Foreign countries need to be able to deal with one entity—the federal government—in order 
to be sure of the “status, safety, and security” of their citizens.  See Arizona v. United States 
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
2003)).  John Jay was concerned that if the states were left to their own devices, border 
states would act impulsively based on local concerns and create problems with foreign 
nations.  THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 39 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).  He discussed 
how some states had mistreated Native Americans within their borders.  Id.  There seems to 
be a great deal of parallel with Jay’s concerns and immigration issues, which presumably is 
why the Supreme Court referenced his essay in their recent decision.  There seem to be 
parallels to the issue here as well.   
 127.  See English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990) (explaining preemption in 
context with Congress’ enactment of laws to limit the nuclear industry’s liability). 
 128.  See id. at 79 (explaining how courts can infer preemption from Congressional 
Acts). 
 129.  See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947) (providing 
multiple cases that show how Congress can issue laws intended to preempt state laws). 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 (1976). 
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and “protect workers within the [s]tate,” and searched for evidence of 
Congressional intent to displace state law.
132
 
The Court noted a particular provision of federal law prohibiting farm 
labor contractors from hiring undocumented workers.
133
  The provision 
included language stating that it was merely intended to “supplement” state 
laws and regulations, and that the state rules were still in effect.
134
  The 
Court construed this provision as persuasive evidence that Congress had 
not “unmistakably . . . ordained” a total occupation of the field, and 
rejected the challenge to the California law.
135
 
The Court did not consider whether the California law was preempted 
because it stood as an obstacle to federal law.
136
  Instead, the Court noted 
the importance of discerning the proper construction of the California law 
before reaching a conclusion.
137
  It suggested that the outcome might 
change if the law applied to immigrants that were lawfully permitted to 
work here, but were not entitled to lawful residence.
138
 
De Canas is an old case.  In 2012, the Supreme Court addressed it in 
Arizona v. United States,
139
  noting that De Canas’ holding was limited to 
its own time period because federal immigration law has changed since the 
1970s.
140
  Still, the Court’s overall approach in De Canas remains useful, 
and dicta at the end of the decision is instructive for its discussion on 
obstacle preemption and the importance of statutory construction. 
Toll v. Moreno is another important background case.  In Toll, the 
Court held that the University of Maryland could not discriminate against 
nonimmigrants by preventing them from receiving in-state tuition.
141
  The 
Court noted that, “state regulation not congressionally sanctioned that 
discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is 
impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by 
 
 132.  Id. at 356-57. 
 133.  See id. at 361-62 (citing a provision of the Farm Labor Contractor Regulation Act). 
 134.  See id. (exploring the relationship between the Farm Labor Contractor Regulation 
Act and state law). 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. at 363-64. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012). 
 140.  Id.  See also, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011) 
(discussing De Canas in light of changes to federal law). 
 141.  Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982), (citing Takahashi v. Fish & Game 
Comm’n 334 U.S. 410 (1941) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971)).  By 
citing Graham as supporting its Supremacy Clause analysis, Toll arguably adds support to 
those that argue that Graham has been limited such that its equal protection holdings are no 
longer good law.  However, since Bernal came down two years after Toll, this argument is 
not very convincing.  See supra note 54 (discussing attempts to cabin Bernal). 
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Congress.”
142
  The Court hedged however, adding:  “to be sure, when 
Congress has done nothing more than permit a class of aliens to enter the 
country temporarily, the proper application of the principle is likely to be a 
matter of some dispute.”
143
 
The Court ruled that Maryland’s tuition policy was preempted for two 
reasons.  First, the Court noted that Congress had allowed G-4 visa holders 
(a type of nonimmigrant) to establish domicile in the U.S., and that a state 
policy denying them the right to establish in-state status amounted to an 
impermissible burden not contemplated by Congress.
144
  Second, the Court 
reasoned that since Congress had expressly provided G-4 visa holders with 
significant tax exemptions, Maryland’s policy of financially discriminating 
against them was an obstacle to federal policy.
145
  The Court pointed out 
that the tax exemptions were designed to induce foreign organizations to 
locate in the United States, and that barring employees from receiving 
preferential tuition rates inhibited this effort.
146
  The Court stated:  “we 
cannot conclude that Congress ever contemplated that a State, in the 
operation of a university, might impose discriminatory tuition charges and 
fees solely on account of the federal immigration classification.”
147
 
2. The Circuit Split 
The Fifth and Second Circuits disagreed over whether the Immigration 
and Nationality Act preempts state licensure bans.  The Fifth Circuit 
viewed the licensure ban before it as operating harmoniously with a federal 
law that only peripherally touched on professional licensure.
148
  The Second 
Circuit held that such bans impermissibly conflict with Congressional 
objectives.
149
  The Second Circuit is correct.  Congress occupied the field 
of immigrant employment through its regulations of nonimmigrant 
employment and expressed a policy preference to bring individuals here to 
work professionally.  State laws preventing these individuals from working 
conflict with that goal and are preempted by the federal legislation. 
 
 142.  Toll, 458 U.S. at 12-13. 
 143.  Id. at 13.  G4 visa holders are considered nonimmigrants under federal statute, just 
as H1-B visa holders are.  8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(G)(iv) (2012).  The category includes 
officers and employees of certain international organizations, such as the World Bank, and 
their immediate families.  Id.  
 144.  Toll, 458 U.S. at 14-17. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at 17. 
 148.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 423-26 (2005).   
 149.  Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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a. The Fifth Circuit holds state licensure bans are not preempted 
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit unanimously held that a 
Louisiana rule that prohibited nonimmigrant aliens from sitting for the bar 
exam was not preempted by federal law.
150
  The court held that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) left it up to the states to decide who 
qualifies for professional licensure in a state, and that there is nothing 
prohibiting a state from deciding that nonimmigrant aliens simply do not 
qualify.
151
  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(2)(A) provides that one of the methods for 
qualifying as a practitioner of a “specialty occupation” is to obtain “full 
state licensure to practice in the occupation, if such licensure is required to 
practice in the occupation.”
152
 
The decision’s discussion of preemption began by citing De Canas for 
the proposition that alien employment is a field that “tolerates harmonious 
state regulation.”
153
  The court then attempted to distinguish Toll by noting 
the differences between the G-4 visas held by the plaintiffs there, and the 
H1-B and F-1 visas held by the plaintiffs before the court.
154
  The court 
noted that G-4 visa holders are not transients, but that some nonimmigrants 
are.
155
 
The court then tried to show how the Louisiana rule was harmonious 
with the INA.
156
  It pointed out that student visa holders are restricted in 
their ability to obtain gainful employment, and that aliens could obtain H1-
B visas in other ways aside from obtaining professional licensure.
157
  It 
observed that aliens can meet the specialty occupation criteria by attaining 
a bachelors or higher degree that meets the “minimum for entry into the 
occupation in the United States,”
158
 and that visas may also be granted in 
certain circumstances where states allow persons to work under the 
 
 150.  LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 423-26.  While Judge Stewart dissented in the case, he 
concurred with the majority decision on the preemption issue.  Id. at 426 (chronicling Judge 
Stewart’s dissent). 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(2)(A) (2012). 
 153.  LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 424.   
 154.  Id. at 424 (explaining how F-1 visas are temporary visas held by students studying 
in the United States). 
 155.  The court also oddly suggested that Maryland’s tuition policy in Toll “proscrib[ed] 
by state law what Congress expressly permit[ted] by federal statute.”  Id. (tense changed).  
The court did not point out the section of federal law in Toll that expressly discussed state 
tuition policies, so it is not clear what support there is for this interpretation of the decision.  
The Maryland statute did not prevent matriculation; it just meant that the students had to pay 
more to go there. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id.  As discussed in the introduction, obtaining a professional license is one way of 
fulfilling a prerequisite for obtaining an H1-B visa.  There are other ways of meeting the 
eligibility requirements. 
 158.  8 U.S.C. § 1184 (i)(1)(B) (2012). 
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supervision of licensed practitioners in lieu of having a license 
themselves.
159
  In light of these alternative routes to a visa, the court held 
that the state licensure ban was “in accord, rather than conflict with federal 
regulation of alien employment.”
160
 
The court also held that the Louisiana rule was not an obstacle to 
Congressional objectives.
161
  It pointed out that in De Canas the Court had 
upheld a California law addressing the employment of undocumented 
immigrants in spite of “overlap” between federal immigration regulations 
and the state employment regulation system.
162
  The court held that the case 
before it similarly presented a situation where a federal law had only 
“peripheral[ly]” touched on an area of state regulation.
163
  The court 
concluded by arguing that the Louisiana law was designed to deal with 
local problems, and that this was permissible so long as it was consistent 
with federal law.
164
 
b. The Second Circuit holds state licensure bans preempted 
In Dandamudi v. Tisch the Second Circuit reached a different 
conclusion when considering a New York law that barred nonimmigrant 
aliens from receiving pharmacy licenses.
165
  The court stated that the state 
law was preempted because it stood “as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
166
  The 
court stated that “Congress exercised its immigration power to permit” 
nonimmigrant aliens “to participate in certain [specialty] occupations so 
long as they are professionally qualified to engage in the particular 
 
 159.  LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 425 n.55. 
 160.  Id. at 425. 
 161.  Id. at 425. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).  The Second Circuit’s 
discussion of preemption is dicta because the court held that not all the plaintiffs had 
standing to bring a preemption challenge to the state law.  Id.  Several of the plaintiffs held 
TN visas, which are granted to people interested in coming to the United States pursuant to 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Id.  According to the court, “the 
NAFTA Implementation Act allows only the United States to bring actions against state 
laws inconsistent with NAFTA.  See 19 U.S.C. § 3312(b)(2).”  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66, 81 
(2d Cir. 2012).  Still, the strong language of the court shows how it would have decided the 
case had the TN visa holders not participated.  In light of this, courts should address the 
equal protection issue first to give a definitive answer to whether the law is unconstitutional 
as applied to all skilled guest workers, as opposed to just some of them.  But see, Justin 
Hess, Nonimmigrants, Equal Protection, and the Supremacy Clause, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
2277 (2010) (arguing that preemption should be a court’s first area of concern in light of the 
approach adopted in Toll v. Moreno). 
 166.  Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 80. 
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specialty occupation they seek to practice.”
167
 
The court argued that granting states the right to prohibit 
nonimmigrant aliens from receiving licenses without considering their skill 
set would mean allowing a state’s traditional police power in the field of 
employment law to “morph” into something far different.
168
  Rather than 
simply keeping tabs on the “educational and experiential qualifications” of 
workers, the state would be rendering federal immigration laws 
“advisory.”
169
  The court argued that federal immigration law states that a 
certain class of nonimmigrant aliens should be admitted to the country to 
obtain specialty occupations, subject to a state’s determination that an 
individual has the qualifications to be considered part of that class.
170
  It felt 
that the New York law flipped the law on its head by giving the states the 
right to determine which classes of employees could come to work there, 
and thus stood as an obstacle to the federal law.
171
 
The court further rejected the argument that the hedging language in 
Toll amounted to a rule and added that in any event Congress had done 
more than merely allow nonimmigrants to enter temporarily: it also gave 
them the right to work in certain occupations.
172
  It then cited to twelve 
pages of the Court’s recent Arizona decision with much explanation and 
concluded that the state statute presented serious preemption problems 
because of the obstacles posed to the accomplishment of the purposes of 
the INA.
173
 
c. Analysis 
There is no express preemption provision in the statute, so the analysis 
focuses on implied preemption.  While Congressional intent is not crystal 
clear, the extensive nature of its regulations of nonimmigrant employment 
suggests that it intended to occupy the field except in express situations.  In 
any event, state laws that prevent skilled immigrants from obtaining 
professional licensure stand as an obstacle to Congressional objectives and 
are invalid. 
i. Field Preemption 
LeClerc’s heavy reliance on the De Canas case to support the notion 
 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. at 80-81. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
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that Congress has not preempted the field of state regulations of 
employment law with respect to aliens is problematic.  Arizona narrowed 
the applicability of De Canas, explaining:  “When there was no 
comprehensive federal program regulating the employment of unauthorized 
aliens, this Court found that a State had authority to pass its own laws on 
the subject.”
174
  The Court noted that federal laws had changed 
substantially, and that at the time of the De Canas decision, the federal 
government had expressed no more than a “peripheral concern with [the] 
employment of illegal entrants.”
175
  However, the Court observed that 
federal immigration law had changed, and highlighted the ways Congress 
had begun regulating the employment of undocumented immigrants. 
LeClerc asserts that licensure law is a peripheral concern of the federal 
law because it “does not itself mandate domestic professional licensing” for 
nonimmigrant aliens.
176
  However, following the Court’s approach in 
Arizona reveals that this is overly simplistic.  Congress has expressed more 
than a peripheral concern with the employment of nonimmigrant aliens.  In 
fact, it has adopted an extensive set of regulations about the conditions that 
must be present before an employer can successfully petition for a visa for 
a potential entrant and grant them employment.
177
  Congress has also 
mandated that workers present on a temporary work visa be paid a 
prevalent wage, and that they cannot enter to work at a company in the 
midst of a labor disruption.
178
  The presence of these regulations undercut 
the LeClerc decision’s arguments on field preemption just as new federal 
rules supplanted De Canas’ holding on Congress’ occupation of the field of 
undocumented immigrant employment regulation.  Many academics agree 
that federal law preempts state licensure bans.
179
 
 
 174.  Arizona v. United States 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012). 
 175.  Id. at 2503-04. 
 176.  LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 425 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 177.  See, e.g., Fragomen, supra note 8, at 6:9 (discussing government regulation of 
minimum salaries employers must pay H1-B guest workers). 
 178.  A review of the legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990 was not 
particularly illuminating as to congressional intent regarding the licensure issue.  See, e.g., 
IGOR I. KAVASS, BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1990, A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 101-649 269 (1997). 
 179.  See, e.g., Erin Delaney, Note: In the Shadow of Article I: Applying A Dormant 
Commerce Clause Analysis to State Laws Regulating Aliens, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1821 (2007) 
(discussing the issues of state laws that regulated immigrants and using the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’s as a potential solution); Hess, supra note 165 (detailing the interplay of 
the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause in relation to the constitutionality of 
immigrations laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants); Justine Storch, Legal 
Impediments facing nonimmigrant’s entering licensed professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12 (2011) 
(discussing the licensing issues facing nonimmigrants and the impact of federal immigration 
laws on this process). 
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ii. Obstacle Preemption 
The preemption argument that the state law stands as an obstacle to 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress is strong.  In Arizona, the 
Court relied on the text, structure and history of the federal statute in 
determining Congressional intent.
180
  A logical reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1184 
suggests that the Second Circuit’s construction of the licensure provision as 
allowing a state to impose professional qualification requirements, but not 
barring completely a class of aliens from achieving licensure is correct.  As 
the district judge noted in Adusumelli v. Steiner, the lower court opinion 
preceding Dandamudi, any other reading would render a portion of the 
United States Code merely advisory – if the fifty states so chose, they could 
nullify part of the H1-B program.
181
 
This is supported by dicta in De Canas, where the court was cautious 
about properly construing California’s law so as to ascertain whether or not 
it discriminated against workers who were lawfully present in the country, 
but not entitled to permanent residence.
182
  Apparently the Court felt that 
even under the old, less comprehensive federal law this would have made 
for a compelling obstacle argument. 
While formalistically it is true that potential entrants could still get a 
visa in spite of state licensure restrictions by fulfilling one of the other 
possible requirements, such as having significant experience in the field, or 
by having requisite degrees for entry into the field, it is unclear how a 
potential entrant would be able to meet the other requirements in order to 
actually get a visa.  It seems unlikely that an employer would sponsor an 
employee to come to the United States, given the significant expenditures 
and potential liabilities involved in the application process if it knew that 
the entrant would not be able to obtain a license to practice in the field the 
company brought them over to work in. 
The Fifth Circuit’s answer seems to be that these workers could 
simply work the duration of their visa as apprentices, which is allowable 
under federal regulations, and would not run afoul of licensure 
requirements.
183
  Yet it remains unclear how forcing foreigners into 
unnecessary apprenticeships is not an obstacle to a federal program that is 
designed to enhance the productivity of the United States workforce by 
encouraging foreign talent to join us. 
Furthermore, the similarities with the Toll decision are instructive.  
 
 180.  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. 
 181.  Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 80 (2d Cir. 2012).   
 182.  De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363-64 (1976). 
 183.  See LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 425 n.56 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing how 
federal regulations permit H1-B visa holders to work as a subordinate to someone that holds 
a professional license in certain circumstances). 
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While it is true that the visas held by the plaintiffs in that case differ from 
H1-B and other temporary work visas it is not clear why these differences 
should affect the analysis.  In Toll, the Court ruled that it was 
impermissible for Maryland to interfere with a federal tax program 
designed to encourage a group of aliens to come to the United States.
184
  
The Court stated that:  “In light of Congress’ explicit decision not to bar G-
4 aliens from acquiring domicile, the State’s decision to deny ‘in-state’ 
status to G-4 aliens, solely on account of the G-4 alien’s federal 
immigration status surely amounts to an ancillary burden . . . .”
185
  Similarly 
here, Congress has not barred H1-B aliens from obtaining professional 
licenses, but states are adopting laws that deny them this possibility based 
solely on their immigration status. 
It is not clear why the Fifth Circuit was so focused on the issue of 
transience.  The analogy is simply that states are interfering with federal 
immigration policy by putting up barriers to nonimmigrants that Congress 
did not adopt.  Even if transience was an important distinguishing factor, 
the argument is undermined by Toll’s alternative holding that the Maryland 
policy presented an impermissible obstacle by interfering with the financial 
incentives Congress was offering to G-4 visa holders through its tax 
exemption policy.
186
  That holding had nothing to do with the transience of 
the plaintiffs, and focused merely on the meddlesome nature of the state 
program.  Given the economic benefits of allowing skilled workers into the 
United States, state licensure bans that inhibit their entrance meddle with 
Congressional goals, just as Maryland’s discriminatory tuition policy did. 
The Second Circuit was correct in pointing out that the hedging 
language the Court adopted is not a rule, and that in any case, Congress has 
done more than simply allow nonimmigrants to enter the country.  State 
laws that prevent nonimmigrant aliens from obtaining professional licenses 
as a class represent an unconstitutional interference with federal 
immigration regulations. 
CONCLUSION 
While there may be a valid debate about the proper role of skilled 
guest workers in the United States economy, the place for that debate is in 
Washington, not state legislatures.  The equal protection clause protects 
skilled guest workers against the passions and prejudices of a political 
system in which they are not allowed to participate, in spite of their 
substantial contributions to our economic growth. 
 
 184.  Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1982). 
 185.  Id. at 14. 
 186.  Id. at 16. 
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Leaving immigration regulations to the federal government means that 
we will continue to present ourselves to the world as one country, with one 
door.  When a national consensus is achieved, states should not attempt to 
undermine that effort by adopting laws that conflict with Congressional 
goals.  Allowing state licensure bans that affect skilled guest workers opens 
the door to a patchwork system of immigration policies that will interfere 
with American businesses. 
In light of the split amongst the Circuit Courts on both the equal 
protection and preemption issues, it might be wise for members of 
Congress to consider adopting an express preemption clause prohibiting 
states from adopting licensure bans that apply to skilled guest workers 
based on their immigration status alone, as opposed to a more 
individualized assessment that includes their skills, training and ties to the 
state.  Such a move would cement the hard work members of Congress are 
putting in to achieve a consensus on immigration reform legislation.  While 
legal analysis shows that state level attempts to undermine that consensus 
are unlikely to succeed, such a provision would make it a more open and 
shut case. 
 
